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Disorders of consciousness and the self are at the forefront of schizophrenia
symptomatology. Patients are impaired in feeling themselves as the authors of their
thoughts and actions. In addition, their flow of consciousness is disrupted, and thought
fragmentation has been suggested to be involved in the patients’ difficulties in feeling
as being one unique, unchanging self across time. Both impairments are related to
self disorders, and both have been investigated at the experimental level. Here we
review evidence that both mechanisms of motor control and the temporal structure
of signal processing are impaired in schizophrenia patients. Based on this review,
we propose that the sequencing of action and perception plays a key role in the
patients’ impairments. Furthermore, the millisecond time scale of the disorders, as
well as the impaired sequencing, highlights the cooperation between brain networks
including the cerebellum, as proposed by Andreasen (1999). We examine this possibility
in the light of recent knowledge on the anatomical and physiological properties
of the cerebellum, its role in timing, and its involvement in known physiological
impairments in patients with schizophrenia, e.g., resting states and brain dynamics.
A disruption in communication between networks involving the cerebellum, related
to known impairments in dopamine, glutamate and GABA transmission, may help to
better explain why patients experience reduced attunement with the external world and
possibly with themselves.
Keywords: time, agency, sequencing, Simon effect, motor control
INTRODUCTION
Understanding how neurobiological and cognitive disorders in schizophrenia lead to clinical
symptoms like self disorders is a crucial step towards understanding the link between genetic
and molecular mechanisms on one hand, and the most integrated aspects of our psychic
life on the other. Here we focus on timing and on the cerebellum as a point of convergence
between several lines of exploration of both sensory and motor aspects related to the self in
schizophrenia patients. Our analysis of the literature, especially concerning possible convergence
between observations in the motor and timing domains, indeed suggest a common explanation
and the involvement of a brain network that includes the cerebellum. First, we summarize
data on agency, i.e., the feeling of being the author of one’s own actions, followed by data on
timing, before discussing a possible explanation for the results and their clinical implications.
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AGENCY DISORDERS IN PATIENTS WITH
SCHIZOPHRENIA
The Inverse and Forward Models
Delusions of control represent one of themost striking symptoms
of self disorder in patients with schizophrenia and were
categorized as a first rank symptom by Schneider (1955).
When suffering from such delusions, patients can feel they are
controlled or influenced by other agents, and these agents can be
as varied as god, the television, or extraterrestrial beings. They
thus misattribute their thoughts and actions to an external force,
and thismisattribution is interpreted as an impairment of agency,
i.e., an impaired ability to feel one is the agent of one’s own
thoughts and actions.
Seminal work by Frith (2005) has led to heuristic hypotheses
linking brain dysfunctions and agency disorders observed at a
clinical level. Frith’s hypotheses were based on theories resulting
from the exploration of motor control, and especially the
‘‘internal models’’ (‘‘inverse’’ and ‘‘forward’’). Both ‘‘inverse’’
and ‘‘forward’’ models are necessary to translate intentions
into actions. The inverse model is used first, before the
execution of the action. The input of the inverse model is
the sensory expectations related with the desired goal, and the
associated motor commands that have been learned through
development (e.g., drinking from a glass is associated with
motor commands in the arm). In order to achieve the desired
goal, the inverse model predicts the consequences of the
learned motor command before its execution and adjusts
it on the basis of the current state of the body (Wolpert
et al., 1998). The forward model is fed with a copy of the
final version of the motor program (the efference copy) and
predicts its sensory consequences during the action (von Holst
and Mittelstaedt, 1950). Again the motor program is adjusted
in case of a mismatch between expected and real sensory
consequences.
The comparison between the expected and actual sensory
feedback has also been proposed to play a role in the sense of
agency. The sense of being the author of one’s own actions would
indeed be reinforced if the match between the expected and
actual outcome is reasonable (Frith, 2005).
Several authors have shown that loops of motor control
are dysfunctional in schizophrenia, with alterations in the self-
attribution of the action in patients. A wide-spread hypothesis
states that the sense of agency is disturbed in patients due to
an alteration at the level of the efference copy (Franck et al.,
2001; Jeannerod, 2009; Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2010).
As a consequence of a disturbed efference copy, patients would
not benefit from the match between the predicted and actual
outcome of the action, resulting in a weakening of the sense of
agency. The delusional belief of being controlled by an external
agent would then develop in the case of additional impairments,
e.g., abnormal binding between an action and its effect (Haggard
et al., 2003; Frith, 2005). Several points remain unclear, however,
and our aim here is to synthesize this literature to try and better
circumscribe the nature of the impairments, to better understand
how self disorders emerge in schizophrenia.
Cancellation of Predicted Sensory Signals
in the Case of Self-Initiated Actions
Both EEG and behavioral studies show alterations in the
mechanisms associated with action planning in patients. Several
studies have been based on the fact that the processing of
the sensory signal occurring as a result of a willed action is
canceled (Shergill et al., 2003; Izawa et al., 2008; Brooks and
Cullen, 2013). This would help distinguish between signals
resulting from one’s own action and those that are not self-
initiated. This distinction is important for several reasons.
It may play a role in our sense of self, but is also crucial
to our adaptation to environment signals. First, canceling
predicted signals would help avoid interference with external
sensory inputs, and enable better detection of unexpected
signals. Furthermore, sensory cancellation is important for the
adjustment of action. Note that in the case of an unexpected
stimulation, one has to react reflexively, for example, in order to
maintain postural balance and stabilize one’s gaze and head in
space (Massion, 1994; Cullen et al., 2011). In contrast, in the
case of a voluntary action, the action should not be interrupted
by a reflexive reaction, because the planning of the action
takes the stabilization of the posture into account. In this
case, a corollary discharge is used to cancel the processing of
the sensory outcomes of the action, which are predicted by
means of the efference copy. This would help avoid processing
and reacting to the predicted sensory signals inappropriately.
Several authors have suggested that patients with schizophrenia
do not show normal corollary discharges but that they are
unable to inhibit the sensory signals that result from voluntary
actions (Blakemore et al., 1998; Shergill et al., 2005). For
example, Shergill et al. (2005) designed an elegant paradigm
to check for inhibition of haptic feedback. They applied a
constant force to the top of the subject’s left index finger,
by means of a torque motor and a force transducer attached
to a lever. The subjects were instructed to reproduce this
force by pressing the lever with their right index finger for
3 s, while the force transducer still rested on their left index
finger. The inhibition of the sensory feedback led subjects
to underestimate the force they produced as revealed by
compensatory overproduction of the force applied on the
lever with the right finger (Shergill et al., 2003). Patients
with schizophrenia showed the same profile, but the effect
was significantly reduced in amplitude (Shergill et al., 2005).
Abnormal corollary discharges have also been suggested for
eye movements (Thakkar et al., 2015), speech (Ford et al.,
2007) and even simple tones (Ford et al., 2014). Interestingly
the two latter studies used EEG, thereby confirming inhibition
of the auditory signal in healthy volunteers (N1 suppression,
meaning a reduction in the amplitude of the evoked potential
observed 100 ms after speech onset, Wang et al., 2014). They
also showed that EEG activity in the delta/theta range preceding
speech predicted N1 suppression. Activity preceding speech
can be attributed to action preparation and is believed to
correspond to the production of the efference copy. These
phenomena, i.e., activity preceding speech onset and subsequent
N1 suppression, were all impaired in patients (Ford et al., 2007,
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2014). These authors suggest that something is impaired in
the patients’ preparation of the action and in their ability to
suppress predictable signals. However, whether the impaired
cancellation of the predicted sensory inputs result from an
alteration of the corollary discharge, a sensory dysfunction or
from a temporal mismatch in cortical networks remains to be
clarified.
It appears that the efference copy is at least partially preserved.
First, it has been shown that patients with schizophrenia
are able to automatically adjust their action in the case
of an unexpected sensory distortion (Fourneret et al., 2001;
Knoblich et al., 2004; Jeannerod, 2009). Moreover, when the
patients had to use a manipulandum to resist an imposed
collision with a pendulum, they normally adjusted their grip
force while looking at the falling pendulum (Delevoye-Turrell
et al., 2003). It is noteworthy that in this experiment, the
adaptation was explicitly required from subjects. Grip force
was also scaled to force impact in the case of voluntary
hits on the pendulum. In addition the inhibition of the
sensory signals resulting from self-initiated actions is reduced
but not suppressed (Shergill et al., 2005; Ford et al., 2007,
2014). These results question the nature of the impairment
at the level of the efference copy. Furthermore, a series of
impairments has been observed even when the task does not
require subjects to consciously attend to their action (Ford
et al., 2014; Thakkar et al., 2015). For example, Ford et al.
(2014) asked subjects to press a button, and this key press was
associated with a tone occurring simultaneously with the key
press. The task did not require any subjective judgment from
the subjects, but both the evoked potentials observed before
the key press (the lateralized readiness potential [LRP]) and
those observed after the key press (the N1) were reduced in
amplitude in patients relative to controls. These results have
been interpreted in terms of a deficit in both the efference
copy (thought by the authors to be reflected in the decreased
LRP) and the corollary discharge, resulting in a decrease in the
subsequent sensory suppression (the N1 suppression), similar
to that described regarding speech (Ford et al., 2013). The
decrease in LRP may or may not reflect the efference copy,
but suggests that action preparation mechanisms are impaired
in patients with schizophrenia. Observations with a similar
EEG paradigm (Whitford et al., 2011) provided an alternative
explanation. This time the sound occurred simultaneously,
50 ms, or 100 ms after the key press. As in previous
studies, the authors recorded the suppression of the evoked
potential N1, which is assumed to occur as a consequence
of the corollary discharges. N1 suppression with 0 delay was
decreased in patients relative to controls, as in previous studies.
Interestingly however, N1 suppression observed in patients at
50 ms delay had the same amplitude as the N1 suppression
observed in controls at 0 ms delay. This may mean that
a corollary discharge is sent normally, but arrives too late.
This would be consistent with the literature showing abnormal
connectivity in schizophrenia. Indeed, a large body of literature
suggests that the connectivity between brain areas is impaired
in patients, as proposed by Friston and Frith (1995). This is
true both during tasks (Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010; Sheffield
and Barch, 2016) and during resting states, when subjects
relax in the fMRI without doing any specific task (Greicius,
2008; Zhou et al., 2010; Salomon et al., 2011; Hahamy et al.,
2014). Connectivity disorders may be associated with structural
abnormalities in white matter (Kochunov and Hong, 2014;
Wheeler and Voineskos, 2014; Sun et al., 2015), and would be
diffuse rather than localized (Zhou et al., 2010). Even if the
findings are heterogeneous (Liang et al., 2006; Zhou et al., 2010;
Sheffield and Barch, 2016), the outcome would in all cases be
less efficient communication between different areas of the brain.
Such communication impairment may affect the possibility to
send information from one brain location to another, like the
corollary discharge.
Once again however, the possibility that the corollary
discharge arrives too late due to abnormal neuronal connectivity
may not be enough to account for the difficulties the patients face.
First, why the above-mentioned potentials preceding the action
are abnormal would have to be explained. It is not only the signal
transmission that is altered, but also the processing that precedes
this transmission. Second, a delay in the inhibition of the sensory
processing probably does not explain results like those obtained
by Shergill et al. (2005). Recall that, in this experiment, the
subjects had to reproduce a force by pressing on a lever. The
important point is that they had to press on the lever for 3 s.
Hence a 50 ms delay in the corollary discharge probably does
not explain the deficit in inhibition observed in Shergill’s study.
Other factors may account for the discrepancies in the literature,
for example other results that reveal specific abnormalities during
action sequences (Zalla et al., 2006; Delevoye-Turrell et al.,
2007).
Abnormalities in Action Sequencing
Studies that explore action sequencing show impairments
independent of subjective judgments, and suggest that the
planning of a sequence of action is specifically altered in patients
with schizophrenia. Delevoye-Turrell et al. (2007) used a load
cell to time the subjects’ actions when they were asked to
tap their finger on the surface of the cell (‘‘finger tapping’’
task). To tap on a surface, subjects have to lower and then lift
their finger, and the action is thus composed of a sequence
of two motor elements. Such a sequence is different from
sequences used to consciously execute series of actions, like
tapping successively on a blue, red and yellow target. Contrary to
such serial reaction tasks, subjects do not necessarily consciously
break down a tapping action into two actions. On the contrary,
tapping can be considered as one single action, with a single
word to describe the sequence. Nonetheless, subjects plan the
whole sequence beforehand (Billon et al., 1996). Planning allows
them to anticipate the sensory feedback. Indeed, contact with
the surface is usually shorter than the time required for the
sensory signal to reach the brain and for a motor command
to be sent back (Billon et al., 1996; Delevoye-Turrell et al.,
2007). This means subjects can lift their finger immediately after
contacting the surface. Patients, in contrast, appear not to be
able to plan such a simple sequence efficiently (for evidence
of planning deficits in patients, see also Jogems-Kosterman
et al., 2001). Their contact time with the surface is abnormally
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long, as if they were waiting for sensory information regarding
surface contact before lifting their finger (Delevoye-Turrell et al.,
2007, 2012). This is not due to a non-specific slowing down
in patients, since they react normally when the load cell is
slipping out of their hand. In that case they reflexively grasp
the cell as fast as controls (for a more detailed discussion, see
Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2007). Finally, abnormally long intervals
between elements of the action have also been observed in
simple lifting actions. It has been shown that after grasping an
object, patients briefly push it down before lifting it (Delevoye-
Turrell et al., 2003). All these impairments thus occur in very
simple actions that are performed every day and do not require
special attention. It has also been suggested that the alterations
summarized above are independent of the anti-dopaminergic
treatment given to patients with schizophrenia, because they
differ from those observed when dopamine is lacking, e.g., in
patients with Parkinson’s disease (for a thorough discussion on
these points, see Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2003).
All in all, these results were interpreted as a deficit in
sequencing motor elements. If this is true, one can ask
whether this deficit is an alternative explanation for the
impairments reviewed here in patients with schizophrenia.
A sequencing impairment may explain why only some aspects
of motor preparation and sensory prediction are impaired.
Simple movements would be planned correctly and their sensory
consequence predicted. It is the smooth sequencing of actions
that would be impaired, as well as the prediction of the chain
of sensory consequences. This may explain several results in
the literature. In paradigms in which a key press is associated
with a sound, the key press is already a sequence. Patients
need a longer time to lift their finger. They wait for the haptic
feedback to launch the second part of the pressing action. This
would mean that the action is not planned as a whole but bit
by bit. If this is the case, the corollary discharge regarding the
sound would be sent only when launching the second part of
the pressing action. It would thus be sent later in patients than
in controls. The late sending of the corollary discharge may
be added to the probable slowing down of the transmission of
themessage.Moreover, difficulty in planning the action sequence
may explain why the preparation of the action is deficient and
not only the suppression of the predicted sensory signal (see also
Jogems-Kosterman et al., 2001; Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2006).
In all, patients may have difficulty sequencing pressing actions
and sensory processing. This difficulty may be related to timing
difficulties. It is indeed remarkable that difficulties are mainly
revealed in abnormally long delays between motor elements
(Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2007), and that corollary discharge
appears to be delayed rather than suppressed (Shergill et al., 2005;
Ford et al., 2007, 2013, 2014). Moreover, sequencing implies
ordering of motor elements. These results suggest that time, and
especially temporal order, plays a role in these abnormalities.
Miall et al. (1993) emphasized the temporal dimension of
the forward model, as did Waters and Jablensky (2009) more
recently. It is noteworthy that the temporal distortion of the
sensory feedback affected patients with schizophrenia both with
and without delusions of control (Franck et al., 2001). This
suggests that temporal difficulties exist prior to agency disorders.
This observation suggests that timing disorders cause at least part
of the abnormalities observed in motor planning and execution.
The possibility of a timing disorder is reinforced by recent results,
which indeed suggest that patients may have serious difficulty
ordering events.
TIME DISORDERS IN PATIENTS WITH
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Here we focus on the literature concerning infra-second time
scales, because this scale is particularly pertinent for motor
control and the ability to sequence motor elements smoothly.
Several results have shown that patients with schizophrenia have
difficulty tapping in rhythm with a sound and in detecting
rhythm irregularities (Bourdet et al., 2003; Carroll et al.,
2009; Turgeon et al., 2012). Duration judgments have also
been shown to be impaired, even infra-second durations, i.e.,
300–600 ms (Carroll et al., 2008). Furthermore, impairments
have been observed for shorter durations that are closer to
those required for smooth sequencing, i.e., <100 ms. Durations
are no longer perceived for 50 ms intervals (Wittmann, 2011)
but successive events can still be distinguished in time. This
ability appears to be impaired in patients with schizophrenia.
Several studies have indeed shown that these patients have
difficulty detecting asynchronies between visual stimuli (Foucher
et al., 2007; Giersch et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2011; Lalanne
et al., 2012a) auditory stimuli (Foucher et al., 2007) and audio-
visual stimuli (Foucher et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2014). The
difficulty is even greater when patients have to decide on the
order of the stimuli, and not only to detect an asynchrony
(Capa et al., 2014). Such difficulties may already account for
some timing confusions and difficulties in sequencing events
(Synofzik et al., 2010; Whitford et al., 2011), although this
is not the only difficulty identified. Lalanne et al. (2012a)
indeed showed that healthy subjects can distinguish events in
time at an automatic level even when they judge them to be
simultaneous. They used the Simon effect to detect automatic
responses to time delays, independent of subjective judgments.
The Simon effect is defined by a tendency to press the key on
the same side as the stimulus displayed on the screen, even
when the subject of the task does not require processing of the
spatial position of the stimuli. This effect was used as a tool
to measure the implicit, automatic processing of the stimulus
sequence (Figure 1; for a detailed discussion on the mechanisms
underlying the Simon effect, see Hommel, 2011a,b; Van der
Lubbe and Abrahamse, 2011). When stimuli are simultaneous,
each is displayed on one side of the screen at the same time.
In that case, information is perfectly symmetrical and the
response cannot be biased on either side. When there was a
clear asynchrony, however, Lalanne et al. (2012a) showed that all
subjects tend to press the key on the side of the second visual
stimulus (irrespective of whether it is on the right or on the
left side, Lalanne et al., 2012b). Importantly, this bias to the
side of the second visual stimulus is also observed in healthy
subjects when they do not perceive an asynchrony between
stimuli (Lalanne et al., 2012a,b). This bias has been suggested
to reflect an ability to predict and follow visual events over time
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the paradigm used to evaluate the Simon effect. Two squares were displayed on a computer screen with an asynchrony between
0–100 ms by 8 or 17 ms steps. The subjects decide whether the stimuli are simultaneous or asynchronous and press the left or right response key, respectively. At
large asynchronies, the Simon effect shows itself as a tendency to press the key on the same side as the second stimulus, irrespective of the side the stimulus
appeared. At small asynchronies, the Simon effect reveals the same tendency in healthy volunteers, but a tendency to press the key on the first stimulus side in
patients with schizophrenia.
(Poncelet and Giersch, 2015). This occurs over time intervals as
short as 17 ms. The same method was thus used to analyze
results in patients with schizophrenia. Patients also show a Simon
effect (Figure 1), even for time intervals as short as 8 and
17 ms (Lalanne et al., 2012a,b; Giersch et al., 2015). However,
instead of being biased to the side of the second square, they
were biased to the side of the first square for asynchronies of
8 and 17 ms (again, this effect was observed independently of
the side on which the first square appeared, see Giersch et al.,
2015).
The results suggest that patients do not lack temporal
accuracy, inasmuch as they distinguish stimuli in time, at
least implicitly. However, they appear to have difficulty
predicting/following events over very short time intervals, as
if they are stuck on the first event, and unable to move
smoothly from one event to the other. This difficulty has been
shown to correlate with the patients’ difficulty in detecting
an asynchrony and in ordering visual stimuli (Giersch et al.,
2015). This suggests that the abnormalities observed at 8 ms are
related to difficulties in processing the sequence of two events.
Two asynchronous and successive events indeed represent a
sequence of events. This is where these results converge with
those described on motor actions. Difficulty in processing a
sequence of two visual stimuli indeed resembles the difficulty
schizophrenia patients have sequencing motor elements. The
ability to automatically sequence perceptual events would be
impaired in patients, in addition to their difficulty in sequencing
motor elements. It should be noted here that this difficulty
also resembles the difficulties observed with ‘‘Rapid Serial
Visual Presentation’’, i.e., when subjects have to process two
stimuli successively in a sequence of pictures (Mathis et al.,
2011). However, in these paradigms, each stimulus is shown
for 50–100 ms, and the time scale of the phenomena is thus
different. Further studies are required to check for a possible
relationship with the ability to predict/follow events at a shorter
time scale.
The fact that both perception and action impairments
raise hypotheses concerning a sequencing deficit at short time
scales suggests that the two impairments may have the same
origin. This is all the more plausible that a common brain
structure is responsible for different types of sequencing. The
cerebellum is indeed believed to play an important role in
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sequencing, not only for motor programming, but also for
cognitive functions (Leiner et al., 1993; Ito, 2008; Koziol et al.,
2014). The possibility that common mechanisms underlie motor
control and more high-level cognition or perception is not
as surprising as it may seem at first sight. Feinberg (1978),
and Feinberg and Guazzelli (1999) proposed that mechanisms
analogous to corollary discharges are at play during conscious
thought. The idea that predictive mechanisms play a pervasive
role in many if not all cognitive functions is the basis of
embodiment and predictive coding (Friston, 2008). Predictive
coding consists in applying the Bayesian statistical theory to
brain functioning: cognition would require the integration and
exchange of incoming sensory information and expectations, i.e.,
‘‘priors’’ in Bayesian terms. This is not sufficient to implicate
the cerebellum since predictive coding would apply to all
areas of the brain, and corollary discharges may be produced
in many different areas of the brain (Crapse and Sommer,
2008). Here however, we are emphasizing predictions regarding
sequences of sensory information or motor elements occurring
over some milliseconds, and this orients our hypotheses towards
the cerebellum. A role for the cerebellum in schizophrenia is
not new in the literature. Andreasen (1999) already stressed
the importance of the interactions between the cerebellum
and other parts of the brain, and especially the basal ganglia,
the thalamus, the prefrontal cortex, and the medial temporal
lobe, in coordination and time cognitive functions. Andreasen
(1999) hypothesized that the alteration of this network would
be responsible for a ‘‘cognitive dysmetria’’, i.e., difficulty in
coordinating thoughts akin to the disorganization of thought
described at a clinical level in patients. This coordination failure
resembles the sequencing difficulty discussed above. It is also
noteworthy that at least timing impairments have been shown to
be correlated with disorganization in patients with schizophrenia
(Foucher et al., 2007; Giersch et al., 2015), which is consistent
with Andreasen’s hypothesis. The role of the cerebellum and
its interactions with the remainder of the brain are recalled
in the following paragraph, and evidence for disturbances




The Cerebellum, Action Sequencing, and
Timing
The cerebellum plays a major role in the control and learning
of skilled movements and is at the heart of motor coordination
(Thach et al., 1992; Bastian, 2006). The cerebellum can
coordinate the action of many motor units in order to perform
a wide array of complex movements. Patients with cerebellar
dysfunctions (infarct, lesions or degeneration) have specific
motor impairments inmulti-joint coordination. If themovement
is still possible, patients tend to move one joint at a time
and break down their movements, leading to inaccuracies such
as target overshoot and ataxia or dysmetria (Thach et al.,
1992; Bastian, 1997, 2006). It has been shown in primates that
inactivating cerebellar nuclei, the output stage of the cerebellum,
can reproduce these symptoms during a simple reaching task
(Vilis and Hore, 1977). By recording EMG activities, this group
demonstrated that agonist and antagonist muscle contraction
systematically overshoot during the movement. These findings
suggest that the cerebellum controls multi-joints sequencing by
predicting interaction torques between joints, and compensates
for them during the movement. This hypothesis was confirmed
in primates by electrophysiological recordings performed in
the cerebellar nuclei, the output module of the cerebellum.
During voluntary arm movements, neurons located in the
dentate nucleus, which form a close loop with the cerebral
cortex (Kelly and Strick, 2003), can discharge before the onset
of the movement (Trouche and Beaubaton, 1980; Schieber and
Thach, 1985; Thach et al., 1992; Figure 2). In contrast, those
located in the interposed nucleus, which communicates with
the motor cortex (Hoover and Strick, 1999) discharge mostly
during movement execution (Thach, 1978; Harvey et al., 1979).
Therefore, the cerebellar hemispheres may be involved in the
preparation of the motor program or movement rehearsal
and the intermediate part and the vermis may control the
ongoing sequencing of movement, posture and gait. Indeed,
experiments combining EMG and MEG recordings in humans
showed that such multi-joint movements combine activity in the
contralateral primary cortex, the premotor cortex, the thalamus
and the ipsilateral cerebellum (Gross et al., 2002; Schnitzler
and Gross, 2005) and involve a synchronized oscillatory
network at 6–9 Hz.
Controlling the sequencing of individual components for
a voluntary movement means that the cerebellum has to
implement two important tasks: (1) receive an internal copy of
the motor program (the efferent copy or corollary discharge;
Figure 2); (2) use an internal model of the motor apparatus
(forward model) or controller (inverse model; Figure 2; for a
review see Wolpert et al., 1998) in order to predict the sensory
consequences of unitary events. A wealth of studies have
demonstrated that the cerebellum receives an internal copy (the
efferent copy or corollary discharge) of the motor command
through the mossy fibers, one of the two main excitatory input
pathways to the cerebellum (Figure 2A), and can learn to predict
the future state of the body (Wolpert et al., 1998; Kawato, 1999;
Ito, 2005, 2008; Bastian, 2006; Ebner and Pasalar, 2008; Bhanpuri
et al., 2013; Figure 2). Studies in rodents and in primates describe
how the Purkinje cell (PC) discharges, the sole output of the
cerebellar cortex, correlates with different kinematic features of
the movements as required for a forward internal model of the
motor apparatus (Angelaki et al., 2004; Popa et al., 2012; Azim
and Alstermark, 2015; Chen et al., 2016; Tomatsu et al., 2016). If
proper action sequencing relies on forward models stored in the
cerebellum, then learning mechanisms must constantly adjust
these models as the relations between individual elements of
the body (e.g., muscles or joints) change continuously. Indeed,
the olivo-cerebellar pathway via the climbing fibers controls
plasticity events in the cerebellar cortex underlying adjustments
in forward models (Figure 2; Ito, 2005, 2008; D’Angelo, 2014).
Such learning properties have been demonstrated in many
different paradigms both in rodents and in humans: the gain
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 303
Giersch et al. Time, Cerebellum, Self and Schizophrenia
FIGURE 2 | Involvement of the cerebellum in action sequencing and timing. (A) Basic organization of the olivo-cerebellar circuit. The cerebellum receives two
main excitatory inputs: the mossy fiber pathway (in blue) carrying sensorimotor information from the cerebral cortex via the pontine nuclei (PN), the brainstem (BT)
and the spinal cord; the climbing fiber pathway (in red) originating in the inferior olive and conveying integrated signals. Both inputs converge to the Purkinje cells
(PC), the sole output of the cerebellar cortex, directly for the climbing fiber or through a relay on the granule cells (GC) for the mossy fibers. (B) The cerebellum
controls sensorimotor systems at several levels: (1) during the planning of motor programs, prefrontal and premotor cortices send a copy (“efferent copy”) of the plan
to the cerebellar hemispheres through the PN and the mossy fibers. Cerebellar inverse internal models of the body adjust the corresponding motor command based
on information received through other mossy fiber inputs conveying sensory inputs that build a dynamic picture of the current state of the body (mossy fiber
pathways in blue). Ultimately, the prediction is sent back to the forebrain via the thalamus and used to adjust the motor plan. (2) When the motor plan has been
validated by the premotor systems, the motor cortex generates the program and sends it both to the motor apparatus for execution and to the cerebellar cortex as
an efferent copy that will be at the base of the ongoing control of movement execution. Another prediction through cerebellar forward models and based on the
expected sensory feedback is then used to adjust the motor plan online in the motor cortex and to adapt the movement via brainstem nuclei. Therefore, prediction
pathways are compared (dashed line and black square) at different levels of motor control with the actual sensory feedback in order to cancel the expected sensory
feedback which allows the detection of unexpected events. One type of comparison leads to the emission of an error/unexpected signal through the inferior olive
and the climbing fiber pathway (in red) and causes plastic changes in the cerebellar cortex in order to adjust internal models. Since the perception of a movement as
being voluntarily executed is linked to an appropriate cancellation of the predicted sensory feedback, dysfunctions in these different comparisons may lead to agency
disorders. Internal models of the cerebellar cortex are constantly adjusted through synaptic plasticity controlled by the climbing fiber pathway (in red) that convey
information about the sensory outcomes of the motor program.
of the vestibulo-ocular reflex (Jörntell and Hansel, 2006) or
the ocular saccades (Dash and Thier, 2014) or simply when
throwing a ball at a visual target (Martin et al., 1996). Notably,
in the latter experiment patients with a lesion in the olivo-
cerebellar system showed impaired prism adaptation during
throwing. All these studies assessed the role of the cerebellum in
action sequencing, but how and where predictions made by the
cerebellum are combined with the motor program is still an open
question.
An appealing hypothesis is that the prediction can cancel
the self-induced sensory feedback in order to detect unexpected
events (see above and Blakemore et al., 1998). Unexpected events
which could lead to motor errors would then be corrected and
participate in the adjustments of the cerebellar internal models
through learning (Diedrichsen et al., 2005; Popa et al., 2012).
Indeed, recent experiments in primates (Brooks and Cullen,
2013; Cullen, 2014) demonstrated that the output signal of one
cerebellar nucleus involved in the vestibular control of head vs.
body motion is canceled during a voluntary movement while
neuronal discharge is correlated with movement when passively
executed. These elegant experiments demonstrate that the
cerebellum receives an efferent copy of the motor program and
computes an expected sensory feedback through a forwardmodel
of themotor apparatus to cancel the actual sensory feedback. This
processing may lead to an emerging property: the differentiation
between self- and externally induced sensory signals, a key
feature frequently altered in schizophrenia (see above). If the
cancellation of an expected sensory feedback underlies the
proper sequencing of actions, then the cerebellar control would
rely on its capacity to properly time neuronal processes, as
suggested by experiments in which patients were asked to draw
circles repetitively (Spencer et al., 2003). Cerebellar patients
were severely impaired when asked to pause between each circle
while continuous drawing was normal. Also, implicit timing is
likely to be a key mechanism for appropriate anticipation of
the next step in a complex movement or in the cancellation
of the re-afferent sensory input (Manto et al., 2012). Patients
with ataxia, a family of typical cerebellar diseases, are impaired
in the precise timing of individual components involved in
rapidmovements (Bastian, 1997). Moreover, a classical paradigm
of cerebellar learning, eyelid conditioning, is based on event
timing and the processing of time. The protocol consists in
controlling eyelid closure following a single air puff into the eye.
Eyelid closure is a reflex loop, but it can be conditioned by a
single tone if the tone and the air puff are repeatedly presented
in overlapping intervals (delay conditioning). After learning,
eyelid closure is adjusted in time, showing that the air puff is
anticipated with very precise timing. This paradigm has been
intensively studied in the last four decades both in animal models
(McCormick and Thompson, 1984; Yeo et al., 1986; Raymond
et al., 1996; Garcia et al., 1999; Longley and Yeo, 2014) and in
humans (Logan and Grafton, 1995; Parker et al., 2014). MRI and
transcranial magnetic theta burst stimulation of the cerebellar
cortex recently confirmed the specific role of the cerebellum in
the absolute timing of events (Grube et al., 2010). Patients with
cerebellar deficit (lesion or cortical degeneration) are unable to
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acquire the appropriate timing of the conditioned reflex. Also,
an increasing number of studies has demonstrated that deficit in
eyelid conditioning is correlated with schizophrenia (Bolbecker
et al., 2009; Lubow, 2009; Forsyth et al., 2012). All these data
thus confirm the role of the cerebellum in timing and sequencing
events. Since these abilities appear to be at least partially impaired
in patients, it should follow that the cerebellum plays a role in
the patients’ impairments. In the next section we summarize the
imaging evidence for the involvement of cerebellum in patients’
difficulties.
Cerebellar Dysfunction in Schizophrenia?
Several imaging results point to the implication of the
cerebellum in the disorders of patients with schizophrenia.
First many studies have shown that they suffer from minor
neurological disorders and especially discoordination and fine
motor movement disorders (Docx et al., 2012; Bervoets et al.,
2014; see reviews in Picard et al., 2008; Bachmann et al.,
2014). Second, several fMRI studies suggest the involvement
of the cerebellum. This is especially the case in resting-state
studies. In such states, subjects are assumed to mainly have self-
referential thoughts. Inasmuch as reference to self is expected to
be disturbed in patients, this makes these studies all the more
pertinent to analyze the spontaneous train of thoughts in patients
with schizophrenia (Northoff, 2014, 2015). Two studies reported
anatomical abnormalities in patients with schizophrenia relative
to controls, i.e., a subtle disruption in the middle cerebellar
peduncles (Okugawa et al., 2004), or a reduced cerebellar volume
(in patients with schizophrenia but not with bipolar disorder,
Laidi et al., 2015). However, most observations concerned the
connectivity between the cerebellum and other parts of the
brain. Transcranial magnetic stimulation of the cerebellum has
demonstrated that it influences the dorsal attention system, as
well as the default mode network (DMN) whose activation is
observed during resting states (Halko et al., 2010). It is thus not
surprising that the connectivity between the cerebellum and the
DMN has been identified as being disturbed in patients with
schizophrenia, with an excess of connectivity in patients relative
to controls (Guo et al., 2015; Shinn et al., 2015). Interestingly,
Liang et al. (2006) recorded connectivity between all brain
regions, and observed that the cases of increased connectivity
in patients with schizophrenia relative to controls mainly
concerned the relationships between the cerebellum and other
parts of the brain. It might seem surprising that connectivity is
increased rather than reduced, but increased connectivity is not
necessarily optimal. For example, hyperconnectivity involving
different pathways has been shown to be associated with
hallucinations (Hoffman and Hampson, 2012). Besides, reduced
connectivity between the thalamus and the cerebellum has also
been described (Wang et al., 2015), which fits well with the
hypothesis of Nancy Andreasen (1999) regarding a dysfunctional
cortico-cerebellar-thalamo-cortical circuit. It should be noted
that some authors have compared connectivity abnormalities in
patients with schizophrenia vs. bipolar disorders vs. controls,
in various networks including the cerebellum (midbrain-
cerebellum, Khadka et al., 2013; cerebellum-precuneus, Rashid
et al., 2014). These studies revealed abnormalities in patients
with schizophrenia that did not generalize to patients with
bipolar disorders, which suggests these findings might have
some specificity. Moreover, recent techniques aimed at exploring
the dynamics of cerebral connectivity and activation during
resting states, by computing connectivity on successive time
windows (Hutchison et al., 2013). This means that instead of
recording connectivity throughout the scan session, what is
observed is how connectivity patterns evolve dynamically with
time. Ma et al. (2014) used this technique to explore connectivity
in patients with schizophrenia vs. controls. They showed that
the patterns of spatial concordance fluctuate more in patients
with schizophrenia than in controls, and especially the patterns
between fronto-parietal, temporal lobe, and cerebellar regions.
At the present time, it is difficult to derive the exact functional
implications of cerebellar disorders from these studies. We have
seen above that patients with schizophrenia show high temporal
accuracy at an automatic level, suggesting that not all functions
of the cerebellum are impaired. The fact that impairments mainly
concern connectivity between the cerebellum and other parts
of the brain certainly fits the hypothesis that the cerebellum
is not severely impaired per se. Unlike patients with cerebellar
lesions, patients with schizophrenia do not show a marked
slowness in gripping objects (Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2003)
and symptoms that remind of cerebellum lesions are rather
discrete, e.g., a slight effect on postural sway (Kent et al., 2012).
Even though the regions of the cerebellum that are responsible
for sequencing and timing differ from those involved in gait
and posture, it is highly unlikely that cerebellum lesions alone
account for impairments in schizophrenia. As suggested by
Andreasen (1999), the involvement of a network including the
cerebellum is more likely. We propose that the sequencing
role of the cerebellum and how these sequences are integrated
at a conscious level may represent a critical process in the
organization of actions, perceptions, and possibly thoughts in
general. This could affect several aspects of the self, as reviewed
in the following.
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
The idea of a link between perception, action, and self-disorders
is not new. Unusual perceptual experiences have been described
during prodromal phases of schizophrenia, and may be at the
origin of the feelings of depersonalization observed during the
emergence of schizophrenia (Parnas and Handest, 2003; Uhlhaas
and Mishara, 2007; Mishara and Fusar-Poli, 2013; Postmes
et al., 2014). Fletcher and Frith (2009) proposed that unusual
perceptual experiences might be subtended by a disturbance in
predicting and updating beliefs about the world. The originality
of the present work is to approach this question through the
time perspective. The re-reading of the literature together with
our own experimental data suggests that connectivity disorders
in a network including the cerebellum, but also for example,
the thalamus and the frontal cortex, lead to perception and
action fragmentation, and ultimately to self disorders. Elsewhere,
we reviewed how a difficulty in processing trains of sensory
information in a continuous waymay have impact on howwe feel
being ourselves relative to the outer world (Martin et al., 2014).
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Here we only summarize the main ideas along these lines. One
basic idea is that the sense of self would require that sensory
information is felt as being continuous in time. It has been
proposed since long that the sense of temporal continuity relies
on the ability both to retain information in mind and to predict
what will happen next. One famous example is the example of
the melody (Husserl, 1991). When we hear music, at a given
instant, we have both the preceding, the present and the future
note in mind. This implies we are capable of integrating past,
present and future, and hence of linking events in one continuous
perception instead of perceiving fragmented, discrete events. At
a neuroscientific level, predictive coding (Friston, 2008) may be
involved in integrating events over time. Predicting information
on a millisecond scale may indeed play the role of automatically
linking discrete events into a continuous flow of information.
This would make it possible to predict how the environment
will be perceived at the next instant. Confirmation of the
expected information would then confirm that the outer world
is predictable and stable. Conversely, a difficulty in predicting
trains of information would disrupt this sense of continuity.
This might also apply to our body and eye movements (Wurtz
et al., 2011). Feeling oneself as one unique and stable self may
indeed require that both interoceptive and haptic perception
are stable and reliable. Experimental manipulations aimed at
inducing a sensorimotor conflict have been shown to affect the
bodily self, i.e., the feeling of our body ownership (Blanke et al.,
2015). For example, when subjects touch a virtual wall in front
of them while being synchronously touched on the back, the
distance between them and the wall is recalibrated, as if their
back had moved to the front (Blanke et al., 2014). These results
show the importance of haptic information for the sense of self.
More generally, action is dynamic and requires the prediction
of a train of sensory feedback. The prediction then allows a
mismatch to be detected between prediction and actual sensory
feedback, and helps recalibrate the movement. This adaptation
to the environment would contribute to preserve a sense of
stability, inasmuch as our action would be executed smoothly
without conscious disruption. Conversely, a dysfunction of these
predictive mechanisms might result in the outer world being
perceived as unstable. One may wonder whether this briefly
happens in patients on some occasions, as suggested by self-
reports like the following (cited in Chapman, 1966): ‘‘It’s as
if you were seeing one picture 1 min and another picture the
next. I just stop and watch my feet. If I move, everything
alters every minute and I have no control over my legs.’’ As
developed above, we have suggested that disturbances occur in
the preparation of motor sequences or perceptual sequences. In
real life, preparing an action or a thought requires activating
routines of movements or thoughts that were learned at the
youngest age. The results summarized in the present manuscript
lead us to propose that the integration of such routines in a
sequence of actions or thoughts is difficult for patients, even at
an elementary level (e.g., when tapping on a surface, or when
following visual events over very short periods). This hypothesis
may help better understand the precise mechanisms subtending
the patients’ difficulties when they have to prepare actions and
thoughts, monitor them, and plan coherent behavior in general.
The fact that the impairments concern elementary mechanisms
that are beyond consciousness may explain, at least in part, that
patients cannot report them clearly. They may nonetheless be
manifest at a clinical level, and consistent with proposals in the
literature (Mishara and Fusar-Poli, 2013), they may ultimately
lead to delusions. A disruption in the feeling of continuity may
play an important role by affecting the conscious experiences
of the patients. Unusual conscious experiences would then lead
patients to try to explain these changes. As a result, patients may
end up attributing their own actions or thoughts to an external
source. These beliefs are diagnosed as delusions of control, one
of the main positive psychosis symptoms. In sum, a difficulty in
timing sequences of actions and perceptions might be sufficiently
destabilizing to lead to different types of symptoms and self
disorders.
Our aim here was to provide heuristic hypotheses to link
elementary disorders to the most complex and integrated
identity disorders encountered in patients with schizophrenia.
We developed possible links between dysconnectivity in brain
networks including the cerebellum, time disorders and the
self. Can we go further by linking these impairments with
alterations at the molecular level? Although we have no data
pointing to precise molecular and genetic targets, there are
some straightforward links between impaired connectivity and
dopamine, glutamate and GABA (reviewed in Pittman-Polletta
et al., 2015). In addition, abnormal connectivity has been
observed in subjects at high risk for schizophrenia (Whalley
et al., 2005), which suggests a link with genetic risks. Many
candidate genes have been proposed to be involved in abnormal
connectivity in patients with schizophrenia (Bellon, 2007; Boland
et al., 2007; Olié et al., 2009; Balu and Coyle, 2011; Carlson
et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2013). As all these systems of
neurotransmission are connected, genetic variations in one
system might simultaneously impact and disorganize gabaergic,
glutamatergic and dopaminergic neurotransmission. It remains
to be investigated to what extent this abnormal connectivity
concerns the cerebellum, and to what extent it accounts for the
behavioral and clinical abnormalities described above.
CONCLUSION
Many studies have shown motor and perception impairments
in patients with schizophrenia that may lead to disorders of
the self. These disorders may alter the ability to sequence
mental activities, whether action or perception, and may prevent
patients from acting in a coherent way, adapting to their
environment, and feeling the outer world and themselves as
being stable in time. The fact that impairments have been
observed at the millisecond level, especially when sequences are
involved, suggests the involvement of the cerebellum. The role
of sequencing is compatible with the results of many studies, and
can lead to impairments that are similar to those that would result
from an impairment at the efference copy level. However, the
identification of a role for sequences allows us to account for
a series of perceptual as well as motor disturbances. This may
more easily account for the feeling of strangeness experienced
by patients, and their difficulty in following and predicting
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information smoothly. Furthermore, linking the impairments
with a disordered network including the cerebellum allows us
to propose how connectivity disorders and related molecular
impairments lead to the complex self-disorders observed in
patients with schizophrenia. Hopefully future developments
regarding the way action is planned will shed further light on
patients’ impairments, e.g., by allowing us to better understand
how the cerebellum interacts with other areas of the brain and the
respective roles played by the vermis and hemispheric regions of
the cerebellum.
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